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Abstract: 
During the Arab banks-summit in Paris last June 2008, the project of monetary integration in 
the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia) was discussed again. Yet, 
many efforts have been undertaken to reinforce the completion of the regional integration 
process in this part of the world. These were initiated in 1989 by the creation of the Arab 
Maghreb Union (AMU) and expanded last years to cover the possibility of establishing the 
Maghreb monetary union.  
Our aim in this paper consists in assessing the relevance of such a project for three Maghreb 
countries: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.  
To do that, we try to simulate an aggregated monetary rule describing a common monetary 
policy in an open economy. This rule is constructed and compared to national monetary rules 
already simulated in many other works. Such a construction and comparison allow us to 
verify if a common monetary policy will be beneficial to all countries or, if on the contrary, it 
will be beneficial to one country rather than the others. 
Our results suggest that a common monetary policy will be more beneficial to Algeria than to 
Morocco or Tunisia. In fact, the common central bank has to grant more weight to activity 
rather than inflation or exchange rate, a result which often coincides with the national 
Algerian rule. 
 
Keywords: Common monetary policy, exchange rate, optimization, Taylor rule, 
Maghreb 
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I- Introduction: 
 
During the Arab banks’-summit in Paris last June 2008, the project of monetary integration in 
the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia) came up again. Yet, many 
efforts have been undertaken to reinforce the completion of the regional integration process in 
this part of the world. These were initiated in 1989 by the creation of the Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU) and expanded last years to cover the possibility of establishing the Maghreb 
monetary union.  
Indeed, since 2002, the creation of a single currency and a common central bank for the 
Maghreb has always been the main concern of the union of Maghreb banks. Moreover, 
nowadays, the general secretary of AMU is trying to put in place a Maghreb economic 
community project via a detailed research done in collaboration with the African 
Development Bank (BAD). Such a project will be useful to create single currency at a later 
date. 
The driving force for these projects may be the awareness of the Maghreb Countries (MC) 
about the future challenges and the importance of economic and monetary integration as a 
solution to these challenges (reduction of tariff barriers, enlargement of the Economic and 
Monetary Union in Europe, liberalization of the textile sector, association agreements with the 
European Union...). 
In fact, in a new environment characterized by huge competition, these countries have to face 
the “cost of no-Maghreb”. So, as an engine for growth and bilateral trade boost, the 
Maghrebian integration would constitute a considerable support to a more efficient insertion 
to the world economy (Brack 2008). It would also render the zone an attractive destination for 
other investors notably the oil-exporting countries of the Middle-East. Besides, the 
establishment of a supranational central bank as part of a monetary integration process would 
resolve the problem of dependence of national central banks. 
However, on the basis of numerous experiments, notably the European one, here is a heated 
debate about the question of establishing economic and monetary union between different (or 
divergent) countries. This economic and monetary union often comes up against many 
problems, unless there exists a solid institutional setting and a real political involvement.  
Indeed, in Europe, economic and monetary integration was envisaged from the start as part of 
the process of building an “ever closer Europe,” entailing not just a customs union but also a 
single market and not just the closer coordination of national policies but also the creation of 
supra-national policymaking institutions (Eichengreen et Taylor 2003).  
None of these conditions seems to prevail in the Maghreb given the lack of a real desire for 
political involvement and the low volume of intra-Maghreb trade (between 2 and 3%). 
Moreover, the economy of these countries has different economic and financial structures, 
although there is some resemblance about a few economic and social variables (added to 
geography, language, culture, religion...).  
Our aim in this paper consist in evaluating the relevance of the project of monetary integration 
for three MC (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) given their present characteristics. To do that, 
we try to simulate an aggregated monetary rule describing a potential common monetary 
policy in an open economy. This rule is constructed and compared to national monetary rules 
already simulated in many other works. Such a construction and comparison allow us to 
verify if a common monetary policy (and then the creation of a monetary union) will be 
beneficial to all countries or, if on the contrary, it will be beneficial to one country rather than 
the others. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section II describes the evolution of the 
monetary policy in the three Maghreb countries (MC)
2
. Section III highlights the 
methodological framework and data. Within this section, the model describing the functioning 
of MC is presented and the main optimisation method is provided. Section IV presents the 
empirical results and the corresponding explanations. Finally, section V summarizes the main 
findings and draws out some policy recommendations. 
 
II- Monetary policies in the Maghreb: a brief description: 
 
Historically, in the three countries, the monetary policy could be characterized by a transition 
from a situation of financial repression to a situation where the market mechanism prevails 
and from the discretion to the rule. The final aim is to reach credibility and transparency.  
Nowadays, the monetary authorities of these countries try to reach a final goal which is 
refocused around price stability using different intermediary and operational objectives.  
Moreover, for further efficiency, financial liberalization has imposed to them the replacement 
of direct control instruments by indirect ones. These differ from one country to another. 
Indeed, each of them has developed its own instruments of monetary policy which can be 
divided into three categories: operations at the initiative of a central bank, permanent facilities 
and fine tuned operations.  
In these three countries, as well as in MENA, central banks are debtors. Their objective is the 
resumption of excess liquidity which came from interventions over the exchange market. 
Contrary to creditor central banks, which determine their monetary policy according to their 
internal objectives and then act in monetary base to influence the short term interest rate, the 
operations of debtor central banks consist in reacting and sterilizing the liquidity excess 
emerging from the increase in exchange reserves. The origin of this excess may be due to an 
increase in FDI, an excess in current account, an increase in workers remittances from 
abroad...The final objective is the stabilization of the exchange rate (Rattenhuber & al 2008). 
It is effectively the situation in the Maghreb where the resumption of excess liquidity 
becomes the main concern of monetary authorities (especially in Algeria and Morocco). 
It is important to remember finally that the authorities of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia have 
decided to liberalize their financial accounts but at a different speed. In fact, Morocco and 
Tunisia are nearer the realization of this objective than Algeria which has not yet completed 
its transition toward market economy (IMF 2006). 
However, the realization of this objective will impose some changes on monetary and 
exchange rate policies. In view of this, the monetary authorities of these countries have 
decided to go more toward a flexible exchange rate and to replace the external anchor of the 
monetary policy by an internal one via a system of inflation targeting. 
 
III- Empirical Framework and Data: 
 
Our methodology consists firstly in estimating a model characterising the Maghreb. This area 
is chosen as an average of the three corresponding countries (while taking into account the 
weight of each one). 
Once the model is estimated, we should define the most effective rule. To do so, it is essential 
to define a loss function which the potential common Central Bank tries to minimise
3
.  
Our model is estimated using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimator developed 
by Zellner (1962).  The aim of this technique is twofold. First, cross-equations dependence is 
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 Our focus is limited only to Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. 
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 This methodology was adopted in many works such as Durand & Payelle (1998), Freedman (1981), McCallum 
(1994), Penot & al (2001), Penot & Pollin (1999) … 
allowed. Second, endogeneity of the regressors is also taken into account by introducing leads 
and lags of the regressors. The number of optimal lags is determined on the basis of the AIC 
criterion. Besides, this technique explicitly deals with correlation between errors which make 
it more efficient compared to equation-by-equation least squares based approaches. 
It follows that, once our model is estimated, the residuals which are considered to be the 
shocks affecting the economy, are recovered. These respect the distribution of historical 
shocks. It is then a matter of historical simulations which deal with reproducing the past 
shocks.  
Therefore, after the estimation of the model and the recovery of the shocks, we try to 
determine the monetary rules which best fulfil the objective of the Central Bank. We retain 
the Taylor rule in an open economy, the form of which is defined below. The final aim is then 
to determine the parameter of this rule which minimizes the loss function. 
Our methodology is done on the basis of quarterly data over the period 1990Q1, 2006Q4 
which are extracted from the International Monetary Fund database (International Financial 
Statistics) and DATASTREAM. 
 
III-I- The model: 
 
Our model is that of an open economy. It contains an aggregated IS equation (supply and 
demand over goods and services market), an aggregated Philips curve equation (inflation-
unemployment trade-off) and an aggregated exchange rate equation (exchange behaviour) for 
the Maghreb. 
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Where , , i, R and e  are respectively the growth rate of industrial production index (IPI)4, 
the growth rate of consumption price index (CPI), the nominal interest rate (the instrument of 
monetary policy), the real effective exchange rate (REER) and the nominal effective exchange 
rate (NEER) in the Maghreb. )(LA , )(LB , )(LC , )(LD , )(LE , )(LF , )(LG , )(LH and )(LK are 
the traditional polynomial lags.  ,   and   are error terms. 
Given that the model describes the dynamic of plural aggregated variables, we have obtained 
these variables by considering the Maghreb as an average country –composed of Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia – and by calculating these variables as follow: 
iit yy  ( 3,2,1i ) where totii yy / and 321 yyyytot   
3/it ZZ  ( 3,2,1i ) with Z  representing successively the variables , i , e  then E. 
The first equation shows the effect of monetary and exchange rate policy on the activity and 
therefore on the real sphere. An appreciation (depreciation) of the REER implies a price 
increase (a price fall) of the domestic goods comparing to the foreign ones which leads to a 
decrease (increase) in domestic production. Also, a restrictive (expansionist) monetary policy 
reflected by an increase (decrease) in interest rate acts negatively (positively) on the global 
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 This indicator must be taken with cautious given the bad representation of the total production by the industrial 
production. The use of this indicator is justified by the lack of data. 
y
demand component and leads to a decrease (increase) in domestic production. The expected 
coefficients for E and )( tti  are then negative. 
The second equation shows how economic growth and exchange policy affect prices
5
. An 
appreciation (depreciation) of NEER makes domestic products less required (more required) 
and decreases (increases) the inflationary pressures while a rapid (sluggish) economic growth 
due to expansionist (restrictive) monetary policy for example leads to an acceleration 
(deceleration) of inflationary pressures
6
. This argument is often stated by central bankers 
when they claims that demand increases more rapidly then supply. The expected coefficient 
for e is then negative while that of y is positive. 
Finally, the third equation shows how the evolution of inflation and activity acts on the 
exchange rate. Higher (lower) inflation leads to a depreciation (appreciation) of the NEER 
following a price increase (decrease) of domestic goods while low (high) activity growth has 
the same effect (reverse effect). The expected coefficient for   is negative while that of y is 
positive. 
 
III-II- The rule: 
 
As mentioned above, our aim here is to determine the monetary rules which minimise a loss 
function
7
. We retain the Taylor rule in an open economy which the simple form is as follows: 
 
*)(*)(*)(1 eeyyii ttttt     
 
Where ,   and  are respectively the weight attached to activity, inflation and exchange rate 
by the Central Bank. Moreover, the existence of the term 1ti expresses the interest rate 
smoothing behaviour of the emission institute (or the monetary policy inertia). Moving the 
policy rate by small steps in the same direction increases its impact on the long term interest 
rate because market participants expect the change to continue and hence price their 
expectations into forward rates (Mohanty & Klau 2004). Such practice is also often present, 
especially in countries where banking and financial weakness is significant. It also expresses 
the willingness to maintain the credibility of the Central Bank and the reduction of uncertainty 
that mark the key parameters of the structure of the economy. These parameters govern the 
transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. Lastly, *)( yyt  represent the output gap or the 
difference between current production and potential production, *)( t is the deviation of 
inflation from its target value and *)( eet   is the deviation of current exchange rate from its 
equilibrium level. However, given the difficulty of estimating this level, we replace the 
expression *)( eet  with the nominal effective exchange rate variation )( 1 tt ee . 
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 We consider that the hypothesis of Stock and Watson (1999) is verified (the potential economic activity is 
constant over the short term period) and that the activity, rather then the output gap, affects inflation.  
6
 It is the effect of imported inflation in an opened economy. 
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The general form of this loss function is : 
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1
222 )(*)(*)(*)()(  tttttt iiEeeEyyEELE  . We suppose that each element 
in the loss function is identically weighted, which means that .1   This function expresses the 
willingness of the monetary authorities to reduce inflation fluctuations, output gap and exchange rate variations 
in accordance with their objectives. The existence of interest rate in the loss function is justified by the fact that 
most efficient rules in term of activity stabilisation and inflation control generate very high interest rate 
variations. For further details on the shape of the loss function in a closed economy, see Penot & al (2001), 
Woodford (1999). 
As such, the Taylor rule expresses the behaviour of the Central Bank in setting the interest 
rate which follows a change in corresponding variables. In general, the Central Banks raise 
their interest rates when the output gap increases (situation where current production is far 
from potential production), the inflation gap deepens (situation where current inflation is far 
from its target value) and also when the exchange rate gap increases (situation where e  
increase comparing to 1te )
8
. 
So, our objective consists in observing the behaviour of monetary authorities following a 
shock hitting the economy. For that purpose, we use a model with four equations: the first 
three describe the functioning of the economy (the model above) while the last one is the 
Taylor rule. We look through this rule for the parameters  ,,  in the interval [0.1:10.1] by 
choosing a step of 0.1 and by repeating 250 times. We hold the value of the coefficients which 
corresponds to the minimal loss function. 
To do so, we suppose that the money market rate (MMR) is the instrument of monetary policy 
(while Maghrebian Central Banks have not until now developed an official policy rate). 
Moreover, most banking rates are indexed in MMR, which reinforces our choice. We further 
suppose that  =1 in the Maghreb since the common Central Bank has to gain in maintaining 
financial stability and reducing uncertainty by controlling interest rate volatility. Finally, we 
consider that the average potential growth rate for the region ( *y ) is 4.6%
9
 while the average 
inflation target for the same region ( * ) is 2.5%10. 
 
IV- Baseline results: 
 
Before estimating the parameters of the model, we established a stationarity test for the 
different variables to avoid a spurious regression. Using ADF and Phillips-Perron tests, we 
have obtained the following results: 
 
Results of the ADF test 
Variable ADF Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
TCN Level 
First difference 
DW 
-4.793*** 
 
1.161 
-7.799*** 
 
1.678 
-6.461*** 
 
1.69 
TCR Level 
First difference 
DW 
-1.887* 
-6.468*** 
1.9 
-3.388** 
-6.62*** 
1.88 
-3.799** 
-6.69*** 
1.88 
TMR Level 
First difference 
DW 
-1.466 
-4.1*** 
2.06 
-0.035 
-9.95*** 
1.71 
-2.82 
-10*** 
1.72 
TCPI Level 
First difference 
DW 
-1.28 
-11.8*** 
1.74 
-1.44 
-11.74*** 
1.74 
-1.55 
-11.7*** 
1.75 
TIPI Level 
First difference 
DW 
-1.14 
-5.45*** 
2.03 
-11.99*** 
-5.4*** 
2.04 
-12.24*** 
-5.34*** 
2.04 
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 This situation may be due to the increase in domestic prices compared to foreign ones, which lead the central 
bank to raise its interest rate. 
9
 This number represents the medium of the averages obtained in these countries over the period 1991-2006. For 
more details, see Laurence & Boileau (2007). 
10
 For further details regarding the choice of this target, see Brack (2008). 
Results of the Phillips-Perron test 
Variable PP Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
TCN Level 
First difference 
DW 
-3.329*** 
 
1.16 
 
-7.49*** 
 
1.67 
-6.54*** 
 
1.69 
TCR Level 
First difference 
DW 
-1.66* 
-6.45*** 
1.9 
-3.33** 
-6.61*** 
1.88 
-3.88** 
-6.7*** 
1.88 
TMR Level 
First difference 
DW 
-1.62* 
-11.04*** 
2.12 
-1.21 
-15.11*** 
2.15 
-4.17 
-15.45*** 
2.15 
TCPI Level 
First difference 
DW 
-3.18*** 
 
2.27 
-4.65*** 
 
2.03 
-6.28*** 
 
1.9 
TIPI Level 
First difference 
DW 
-25.29*** 
 
1.78 
-48.97*** 
 
2.05 
-56.28*** 
 
2.07 
*** Significant at the 1% level. ***significant at the 5% level. *significant at the 10% level. 
Model (1): Without Constant and Trend. Model (2): With Constant. Model (3): With Constant and Trend. 
 
It transpires then from these two tables that the two non stationary variables are the real 
exchange rate and the real interest rate I (1) while the nominal exchange rate, the growth rate 
of IPI and the growth rate of CPI are stationary I (0). 
We then established an Engel and Granger as well as a Johansen co-integration tests about the 
relevant variables. The following table shows our results:  
 
Results of the Engel-Granger test 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
ADF Statistic P-value ADF Statistic P-value ADF Statistic P-value 
Level 0.03 0.68 -0.06 0.94 -2.79 0.22 
First difference -4.17*** 0.00 -9.31*** 0.00 -9.33*** 0.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results of the Johansen test 
Cointegration test Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 
 
TCR - TMR 
Trace 
statistic 
0.05 critical 
value 
Trace 
statistic 
0.05 critical 
value 
Trace 
statistic 
0.05 critical 
value 
4.28 12.32  
(0.67) 
17.74 20.26 
(0.10) 
24.38 25.87  
(0.07) 
 Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 
 
Cointegration 
test 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 
 
TCR - TMR 
Max-
Eigen 
statistic 
 
0.05 
critical 
value 
Max-
Eigen 
statistic 
 
0.05 
critical 
value 
Max-Eigen 
statistic 
 
0.05 critical 
value 
None 2.73 11.22  
(0.82) 
15.11 15.89  
(0.06) 
14.43 19.38  
(0.22) 
At most 1 0.61 4.12  
(0.49) 
2.63 9.16 
(0.65) 
9.95 12.51  
(0.13) 
Max-Eigen test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level. ***significant at the 5% level. *significant at the 10% level. 
Model (1): Without Constant and Trend. Model (2): With Constant. Model (3): With Constant and Trend. 
 
It turns out from these two tables that the two variables (real money rate and real exchange 
rate) are not co-integrated. The regression is therefore made by using the first difference of 
the two variables for equation (1). However, for equation (2) and (3), the co-integration 
problem does not arise and the regression is simple.  
The estimation of our model has then allowed us to reach the following results11: 
 
SUR estimate for equation 1 
Dependant variable: ty  
Variables Estimate t-value 
Intercept 0,01643 3,26 
1ty  74658,0  -7,03 
2ty  38993,0  -2,81 
3ty  58523,0  -5,1 
2dtcrt  00277,0  -2,35 
2dtmrt  02904,0  -3,34 
7623,0884,161
2
 RDWN  
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 Non significant coefficients are not transferred here, unless they are about one lag. 
SUR estimate for equation 2 
Dependant variable: t  
Variables Estimate t-value 
Intercept -0,01619 -1,94 
1t  0,47446 4,81 
2t  0,28297 2,85 
1ttcn  -0,000066 -0,19 
1ty  0,19271 5,65 
2ty  
0,23024 6,81 
7563,0002,261
2
 RDWN  
 
SUR estimate for equation 3 
Dependant variable: ttcn  
Variables Estimate t-value 
Intercept 8,47663 2,50 
1ttcn  36,5577 13,2 
3t  0,99089 2,6 
1ty  -2,52692 -1,8 
9991,0743,161
2
 RDWN  
 
From these tables, we can notice that the extent of monetary policy on the real sphere is 
modest while the weight of the banking sector in the Maghreb is important. Indeed, although 
there is a small availability of capital direct contributions, the potential common central bank 
seems not to act via interest rate. This behavior may express the desire to allow advances to 
the public sector and to avoid banking disturbance. It may also be strengthened by the 
importance of short-term debts of Maghrebian companies and households and the harmful 
effect of a variation in the interest rate. 
Moreover, the existence of bank liquidity excess in the three countries can explain the weak 
capacity of monetary authority in managing money market operations and so, in influencing 
banking conditions. Interest rate channels turn out to be less functional in the Maghreb. 
Similarly, the effect of exchange policy on activity is low although the degree of openness of 
the Maghreb is important (the average rate is about 82,1% in 2006
12
). In fact, a real exchange 
rate appreciation affects the real activity only after two quarters and at a small fraction. This 
weakness of the exchange rate channel may express the unwillingness of monetary authorities 
to use this instrument. The main cause may be the relatively great part of the debt labelled in 
foreign currency (especially in Morocco) and particularly the fear of imported inflation effects 
(especially for Tunisia and Algeria). 
Concerning the effect of activity growth on inflation, it turns out to be significant. Accelerated 
economic growth for example is translated by an increase in the inflation level and the effect 
appears from the first quarter. This can reflect the fact that in an open economy, the effect of 
growth on inflation is more important than in a closed one. A significant growth rate will 
cause an acceleration of imports and then an inflation bias (imported inflation). Moreover, the 
rigidity of the Maghrebian labour market may not allow a rapid adjustment, which will be 
translated by price inertia. This inertia may be explained by the still important presence of the 
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 Authors’ calculation. 
public sector in the economy, low competition between sectors but also the presence of 
industries characterised by sticky prices. 
In return, the effect of exchange policy on inflation turns out to be small. An appreciation of 
nominal exchange rate for example does not affect the price level (although the three 
economies are open). This effect seems to be the result of continuity in controlling capital 
movements and the absence of total convertibility of the three currencies (the Algerian dinar, 
the Moroccan dirham and the Tunisian dinar). Moreover, as Devereux and Engel (2002) 
noted, in a country where the market power of local participants is important, variations in the 
exchange rate do not hardly affect domestic prices. Besides, as has been mentioned already, a 
good proportion of prices is still administered by the governments of these countries reflecting 
the firmness in establishing price stability. This result can then reflect the nominal rigidities 
and slow adjustment of the prices of good which could make domestic prices less responsive 
to exchange rate movements.  
As for the effect of growth on the exchange rate, it differs from what is expected. Indeed, 
accelerated economic growth will be translated by a depreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate. Rapid growth in the Maghreb may lead to an increase in prices (as found above from the 
estimation of equation 2) and then to a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. This result 
agrees with many works which mention the absence of a Balassa-Samuelson effect (especially 
in the case of Algeria) but should be relativized given the low significance of the coefficient. 
It should be also relativized regarding the effect of inflation on the exchange rate. This effect 
shows that an acceleration of inflation will be translated by an appreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate at the end of the third quarter instead of depreciation. 
Finally, the simulation work has yielded the following results: 
 
Optimization results 
Coefficients       Loss function 
 
Estimate 
2,1 1,3 0,1 175,285 
2,3 1,1 0,1 177,051 
2,5 1,3 0,1 177,445 
 
It turns out that the optimal Taylor rules that can be held as follows: 
 
)(1.0)025.0(3.1)046.0(1.2 1 ttttt eeyi  
 
These results show that the common central bank has to grant more weight to activity rather 
than inflation or exchange rates. In fact, when production corresponds to its potential value, 
an increase of half a point in activity will necessitate an increase in interest rate by 1.05%. In 
return, in the hypothesis where inflation will be on its target value, an increase of half a point 
in prices will necessitate an increase in interest rate by 0.65%. Finally, when the nominal 
exchange rate corresponds to its past value, an increase of half a point in the exchange rate 
will necessitate an increase in interest rates by 0.05%. 
This result may outline the behaviour of Central Banks that partly accommodate non 
monetary pressures on prices in order to reduce costs in terms of output. It may also reflect 
the willingness of the monetary authorities to absorb the demand shock provoked by 
expansionist fiscal policies. The dependence of the Algerian budgetary policy on petroleum 
receipts and the Moroccan and Tunisian ones on agricultural products could lead to a demand 
shock and will render the monetary authority’s reaction more aggressive vis-à-vis the 
stabilization of the activity. 
Likewise, for small open economies where excessive variation of activity considerably affects 
prices, the Central Bank must grant more weight to activity in order to respect its planned 
inflation objective. 
However, we can notice from the rule that the weight of the exchange rate is relatively weak 
compared to the others objectives. This result may reflect the characteristics of the behaviour 
of Maghrebian Central Banks which have means of controlling this variable other than 
interest rate. These banks often use the control of capital account, foreign exchange swaps… 
in order to stabilize the exchange rate expectations. Such behaviours may influence the future 
actions of the common central bank. 
In the same vein, the small reaction of monetary policy for exchange rate variations may 
reflect the nature of the shocks hitting the economy (Mohanty & Klau 2004). Indeed, 
according to Taylor (2002), if the exchange rate varies due to temporary disturbances, the 
interest rate should remain unchanged because such exchange rate movements do not have 
much effect on expectations of inflation. 
In our case, the non reactivity of the Maghrebian Central Banks to this variable (exchange 
rate) shows that shocks are often temporary. This hypothesis seems to be consolidated in 
several works that show that the Maghrebian exchange rates are near their equilibrium value. 
A question can arise at this level: given the specificities of the Maghrebian economies, will 
the reinforcement of this rule be convenient to all these countries or in contrast will it be 
convenient to one country rather than to the others? 
To answer this question, we turn to similar past empirical studies which deal with monetary 
rules in MC (and sometimes in emerging economies) in order to compare our rule to those. 
Haddou (2002) attempts to propose for the Central Bank of Tunisia a formation mechanism of 
interest rate, which balances between macro and micro monetary objectives. She considers a 
system of four equations which represent the functioning of the economy. This system is 
estimated econometrically on the basis of quarterly data available to serve as empirical basis 
for simulations. The system was estimated by the SURE method (Zellner) over the period 
1988-1999. 
The author simulates the model with different rules. She evaluates the performance of each of 
them to determine the best one. Performance measurement advocated for these rules is based 
on the trade-off between inflation variability and output. The most efficient rule finally found 
indicates that the Tunisian monetary authorities have to grant more weight to inflation rather 
than to the output gap. 
Ben Tahar & Rahmani (2006) estimate a set of Taylor rules for the central bank of Tunisia. 
These estimations are made on the basis of quarterly data over the period 1990-2004 and by 
using the GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) technique. In all estimated rules, the 
central bank seems to grant a greater weight to inflation rather than to output. However, the 
monetary authority reacts neither to the evolutions of the stock market index nor to the 
exchange rate. However, it would be rather sensitive to the BVMT’s volatility as measured by 
its standard deviation. 
Belhadj (2008) simulates optimal Taylor rules for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. He 
estimates first for each country a model of an open economy and then he determines the 
monetary rules which best fulfil the objective of each Central Bank on the basis of historical 
simulations which deal with reproducing past shocks. The estimation is based on quarterly 
data over the period 1990-2006. The optimal rules show that Algeria has to grant more weight 
to activity while Tunisia has to grant more weight to inflation. Finally, Morocco has to grant 
similar weight to activity, inflation and exchange rate. 
Lo & al (2003) use Taylor’s policy rule for a sample of 102 countries over the period 1949 to 
2001. They show that the inflation target deviation coefficient is larger in more open 
economies since the corresponding costs associated to this kind of deviation are high. 
Aizenman & al (2008) uses Taylor rule models to test emerging-market central banks’ 
responses to inflation, output gaps and real exchange rates. They collect quarterly data for 16 
emerging market countries over the period 1989-2006 and suppose the following monetary 
policy reaction function:  
ttttt Xyyii    *)(*)(1  
In which Xt may take a few external variables that may also be part of the policy reaction 
function like the real exchange rate or foreign reserves. 
They find a significant interest rate response to inflation and real exchange rates variables in 
countries that are following a system of inflation targeting. In contrast, their results show that 
the output gap is not significant in these countries and its coefficient is lesser than the other 
variables. 
It follows from all these studies that the national rules seem not to coincide with the common 
rule, especially in the Moroccan and Tunisian cases. 
So, how we can explain these results? In other words, why does this optimized rule seem to be 
more beneficial to the Algerian case rather than to the Moroccan or the Tunisian ones ? 
One of the probable explanations is the following: given Algeria’s much larger size, large 
budget and an export structure that differs greatly from its neighbors (which export other 
primary commodities while Algeria exports oil), Algeria has the potential to influence 
monetary policy in ways that potential partners in a monetary union would find undesirable, 
unless there is an effective way of disciplining countries’ fiscal policies and absence of 
similar shocks to the prices of countries’ exports and imports (or “terms of trade”). In that 
case only, would a single currency for the Maghreb seem advisable
13
. 
Moreover, Algeria (which is a rental economy) could benefit further from the diversification 
of Moroccan and Tunisian economy via getting agricultural, manufactured and fishing 
products while Morocco and Tunisia can only beneficiate from Algerian oil products
14
. 
Besides, many empirical works have simulated the net gain for MCs from a process of 
economic integration and the results often indicate that the gainer is Algeria
15
. 
Another likely explanation is related to the fact that, once Algeria has the higher inflation rate 
in the zone (6% against 3% for Tunisia and 2, 5% for Morocco in 2006), the adhesion of this 
country to a monetary union – where a common monetary policy is conducted – allows it to 
tie its hands with the other countries and then to import credibility. Just the fact of imposing a 
rule in this country will be considered as an advantage. Indeed, in Algeria, monetary policy 
sometimes plays the role of fiscal policy; instead of having transparent fiscal subsidies, the 
monetary authorities try to grant advances to the economy (commercial banks). Many 
Algerian banks and corporations are bankrupt but the authorities always commit to help them 
by offering funding facilities (thanks to hydrocarbon receipts)
16
. It follows that imposing a 
monetary rules helps authorities avoid an inflationary bias. 
 
V- Conclusion and policy recommendations: 
 
Starting from the idea that many efforts have been made to bring together the economies of 
MC and reinforce the financial and monetary cooperation between them in order to create a 
single currency, this paper has tried to evaluate the pertinence of such a decision by 
evaluating the consequences of enforcing a common monetary policy between the countries 
of this region. 
                                                          
13
 In that case, we consider the Algerian economy as a “locomotive”. 
14
 This hypothesis should be interpreted cautiously because it contradicts the theory of optimum currency areas. 
15
 For more details, see in particular Bchir M-H & al (2006), Bousetta (2003), World Bank (2006). 
16
 In this case, we call the central bank “a financier of last resort” and not “a lender of last resort”. 
We first described the characteristics of monetary and exchange rate policies in the three 
corresponding countries and explained their foundations. It turns out that, although the 
monetary policies of MC have similar final objectives, the operational frames and the 
monetary instruments used for the realization of these objectives differ from one country to 
another. 
We then presented a simple model reflecting the characteristics of the MC. The estimation of 
this model showed that the extent of monetary and exchange rate policies on activity are low 
and then the interest rate as well as the exchange rate channels are weak. Moreover, the effect 
of activity growth on inflation turned out to be important while the effect of exchange rate on 
inflation is low. Finally, the effect of growth on the exchange rate seems to be significant 
while it is the reverse for the effect of prices on the exchange rate. 
Therefore, we simulated a Taylor rule for this region based on the above-mentioned estimated 
model and the adoption of a specific methodology often used in many empirical works. Our 
optimization results suggest that the common central bank has to grant more weight to activity 
rather than to inflation or exchange rates. 
Finally, we compared this result with many others and we found that the application of a 
common monetary policy over the Maghreb zone would not be beneficial for all countries. 
Indeed, it would not benefit to Morocco or Tunisia given that the potential common central 
bank have to grant more weight to activity, a result seldom found in other works. 
However, making this common monetary policy beneficial to all countries and then ensuring 
a long term success of the monetary integration process in the Maghreb needs more efforts. 
These efforts have to be about improving coordination of financial, monetary and exchange 
rate policies. In this vein, the central banks of the MC have to accelerate their cooperation via 
sharing and exchanging information. They also have to overcome their political conflicts. In 
fact, these countries have to set in motion a “state rhetoric” calling for « Maghreb solidarity 
and fraternity » and pushing citizens towards feeling “Maghrebian”. This feeling may 
constitute a permanent driving force toward cooperation and, at the same time, a major 
hindrance to future conflicts... 
All these measures can help the MC to improve nominal and real convergence and to become 
a homogeneous bloc. They can also bring the monetary integration process more in line with 
the economy of these countries. 
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